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Participation in a social experiment—the proportion of program-
eligible individuals who actually participate—is of interest for two
main reasons.   The first is external validity, or the relevance of an
experiment’s results to implementing a program based on the experi-
ment.  If participation in an experiment differs from participation in an
actual program, then the experiment’s results, however valid they may
be on their own grounds, may yield poor estimates of the costs, the
number of individuals served, and the outcomes for individuals that
could be expected in an actual program.  The issue of translating
experimental results into estimates that are useful for policy is central
to experimentation, and we explore it both here and more fully in
Chapter 6.
Second, differences in the extent to which different groups respond
to an experimental treatment are intrinsically interesting to both policy-
makers and experimenters.   The policymaker’s interest in participation
stems mainly from a need to design policies that are “target efficient,”
i.e., that benefit groups believed to be most in need of assistance.
Other things equal, a program that benefits workers with high earnings
would generally be less desirable than a program that benefits workers
with low earnings.   Similarly, the experimenter’s interest in participa-
tion stems from a need to understand how a treatment “works.”  In the
case of a reemployment bonus, for example, if workers with long
expected spells of unemployment participate in the program—that is,
respond to the treatment and accept the bonus offer—then the bonus
will be effective in reducing the duration of unemployment spells.
78 Decker, O’Leary, and Woodbury
Understanding which groups of workers respond to a bonus treatment
can shed light on the extent to which a bonus is effective.
Many of these issues overlap the issues of treatment impact dis-
cussed in Chapters 4 and 5.  Although it could be argued that impact,
not participation, is the central issue in evaluating and understanding
an experimental treatment, we hope that it will be clear from both this
chapter and Chapter 6 that participation is central to understanding
what the costs of a reemployment bonus program would be and how
the reemployment bonuses in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington
operated.
The next section of this chapter provides a descriptive look at par-
ticipation in the three reemployment bonus experiments.  In particular,
we focus on three measures of participation: the rate at which claim-
ants partially qualified for a bonus (as defined below), the bonus receipt
rate, and the bonus take-up rate.  We then offer an attempt to model and
explain the differences in participation among the experiments using
various regression models.
BONUS QUALIFICATION, RECEIPT, 
AND TAKE-UP RATES
What percentage of UI claimants enrolled in the three experiments
qualified for a bonus?  What percentage actually received a bonus?
What was the bonus take-up rate—that is, what percentage of those
who qualified chose to collect a bonus?
Table 3.1 displays basic data on participation in the three reem-
ployment bonus experiments and allows one to trace the progress of
claimants through the bonus experiments.  As discussed in Chapter 2,
both the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments had multiple treat-
ments: each of these treatments is referred to by its bonus amount (low
or high in Pennsylvania; low, medium, or high in Washington) and its
qualification period (short or long).  In Illinois, there was only one
treatment, but about half the claimants assigned to the single $500
bonus treatment were eligible only for 26 weeks of regular state UI
benefits, whereas the other half were eligible for an additional 12
weeks of Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC), for a total of 38
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Table 3.1 Reemployment Bonus Qualification, Receipt, and Take-Up 
Rates, by Treatment Group


















All treatment groupsc 4,186 42.9 13.6 31.8
Treatment—FSC-elig. 2,337 46.0 15.7 34.3
Treatment—FSC-inelig. 1,589 39.1 11.5 29.4
Control—FSC-elig. 2,106 39.6 — —
Control—FSC-inelig. 1,600 34.0 — —
Pennsylvania experiment
All treatment groups 8,834 56.6 10.6 18.6
Low bonus/short qual. 
period
1,395 46.1 6.9 14.9
High bonus/short qual. 
period
1,910 47.5 8.4 17.3
Low bonus/long qual. period 2,456 61.6 10.7 17.6
High bonus/long qual. 
period
3,073 63.1 13.5 21.4
Control/short qual. period 3,392 42.8 — —
Control/long qual. period 3,392 58.1 — —
Washington experiment
All treatment groups 12,452 55.7 14.6 26.1
Low bonus/short qual. period 2,246 47.0 8.7 18.6
Medium bonus/short qual. 
period
2,348 48.2 12.4 25.8
High bonus/short qual. 
period
1,583 50.2 15.0 29.8
Low bonus/long qual. period 2,387 63.0 13.9 22.1
Medium bonus/long qual. 
period
2,353 61.3 17.8 29.0
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High bonus/long qual. period 1,535 65.9 22.0 33.3
Control/short qual. period 3,082 48.0 — —
Control/long qual. period 3,082 61.3 — —
SOURCE: Tabulations from the Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington Reemploy-
ment Bonus Experiment Public-Use data files.
a See text for full description of each group and the bonus take-up rate.
b Stopped receiving UI by qualification date.
c The number of claimants assigned to “All treatment groups” in the Illinois experiment
exceeds the sum of FSC-eligible and FSC-ineligible treatment-assigned claimants
because claimants who were monetarily ineligible for FSC have been dropped from
the FSC-eligible and FSC-ineligible subgroups.  See Chapters 2 and 4 for further dis-
cussion.
weeks of benefits.  Since the effects of the bonus offer differed signifi-
cantly between these two groups (see Chapter 4), it is important to dis-
tinguish between FSC-eligible and FSC-ineligible claimants.
Table 3.1 also displays data on the control groups from each exper-
iment.  The Illinois control group is divided into those who were eligi-
ble and those who were ineligible for FSC.  For Pennsylvania and
Washington, the percentages of each control group who satisfied the
criteria of the short and long bonus qualification periods are reported.
Column 2 of Table 3.1 shows that between 39 and 66 percent of the
eligible UI claimants who were assigned to one of the bonus treatments
stopped receiving UI benefits within their bonus qualification period.
We refer to these claimants as having “partially qualified” for the
bonus, because in order to fully qualify for a bonus they also needed to
be reemployed (and submit a Notice of Hire) and stay employed for
four months.  We adopt this definition of qualification because the
available administrative data do not allow us to construct a reliable
measure of full qualification that is consistent across the three experi-
ments.
We would expect variation in the percentage of claimants who par-
tially qualified for a bonus to be influenced by three factors: the length
of the qualification period, the bonus amount, and a variety of other
factors such as individual characteristics and labor market conditions.
A longer qualification period clearly makes it easier to qualify for a
bonus.  Hence, it is not surprising that, in both the Pennsylvania and
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Washington experiments, a higher percentage of claimants partially
qualified for the bonus offers that had long qualification periods (11 or
12 weeks).  In Pennsylvania, 62 to 63 percent of claimants partially
qualified for the bonus offers that had a long (12-week) qualification
period.  In Washington, 61 to 66 percent of claimants partially qualified
for the bonus offers that had a long (11-week) qualification period.
Surprisingly, though, only 43 percent of claimants in the Illinois
experiment stopped receiving UI benefits within its 11-week qualifica-
tion period, which was roughly the same as the long qualification peri-
ods in Pennsylvania and Washington.  It seems likely that general labor
market factors played a role in reducing the number of Illinois claim-
ants who stopped receiving UI within the qualification period.  Only 34
and 40 percent of the Illinois controls stopped receiving UI by the qual-
ification date, whereas the comparable figures for long-qualification-
period controls in Pennsylvania and Washington are 58 percent and 61
percent (Table 3.1).1  That is, the labor market and other factors unre-
lated to the bonus experiment reduced the rate at which claimants
escaped from UI during the Illinois experiment.
Higher bonus amounts appear to lead to a higher percentage of
claimants ending insured unemployment within the qualification
period, although the relationship is not strong.  The high bonus treat-
ment led to a slightly higher percentage of claimants ending UI within
the short-qualification-period treatments in Pennsylvania (47 percent in
the high bonus treatment versus 46 percent in the low bonus treatment).
Comparisons across the long-qualification-period treatments in Penn-
sylvania suggest a similar result.  The results are again similar in the
Washington experiment: larger bonus amounts led to higher percent-
ages of claimants who stopped receiving UI within the short-qualifica-
tion-period treatments (47, 48, and 50 percent).  The most generous
bonus also led to the highest percentage of claimants who stopped
receiving UI within the long-qualification-pepriod treatment (65.9 per-
cent), although the relationship between low and medium bonus treat-
ments is anomalous.
Differences between the control groups and the corresponding
treatment groups in the percentage of claimants who stopped receiving
UI by the qualification date foreshadow differences in treatment effects
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.  For example, in Illinois, the difference
in qualification rates between the FSC-eligible control and FSC-eligi-
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ble treatment groups is about 6 percentage points (46.0 vs. 39.6), and
the Illinois bonus had a large effect on unemployment and reemploy-
ment outcomes of the FSC-eligible treatment group.  In contrast, there
are only small differences between the qualification rates of the control
group and the short-qualification-period treatment groups in Washing-
ton (–1.0, 0.2, and 2.2 percentage points).  These Washington treat-
ments had relatively small effects on unemployment and reemploy-
ment outcomes.
Column 3 of Table 3.1 reports the percentages of claimants who
ultimately collected a bonus.  Overall, 13.6 percent of the claimants
assigned to the Illinois treatment, 10.6 percent of the Pennsylvania
claimants, and 14.6 percent of the Washington claimants received a
bonus.  In both Pennsylvania and Washington, the highest rates of
bonus receipt occurred for the high-bonus/long-qualification-period
bonus offers.  In Illinois, the bonus receipt rate was higher among
FSC-eligible claimants than among those ineligible for FSC.
What is striking about the bonus receipt rates is that in Illinois,
where the rate of ending UI by the qualification date was low as com-
pared with both Pennsylvania and Washington, the overall bonus
receipt rate was 13.6 percent—nearly as high as in Washington.  In
Pennsylvania, where the rate of ending UI by the qualification date was
similar to that in Washington (and much higher than in Illinois), the
overall bonus receipt rate was only 10.6 percent.  Compared with either
Pennsylvania or Washington, then, more of the Illinois claimants who
ended UI by the qualification date ultimately collected a bonus.
Why did the Illinois treatment-assigned claimants overtake the
Pennsylvania claimants and nearly catch up with the bonus-receipt rate
of the Washington claimants?  There are two possible reasons.  First,
they may have been more likely to fully satisfy the bonus qualification
requirements (that is, by staying employed for four months) once they
found a job within the qualification period.  Second, they may have
been more likely to claim a bonus when they fully qualified for one.
Whether a worker stays employed for four months after reemployment
(so as to fully qualify for a bonus) is at least partly a question of labor
demand conditions during a bonus experiment.  Collecting a bonus
after qualifying for one, however, is a matter of voluntary participation.
Unfortunately, the available data are inadequate to distinguish between
the above two possibilities in a convincing way.2
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We refer to the propensity of claimants who partially qualify for a
bonus to collect a bonus as the bonus take-up rate.   The rate is calcu-
lated as the number of bonus-offered claimants who received a bonus,
divided by the number who stopped receiving UI benefits by the quali-
fication date (that is, partially qualified), expressed as a percentage.
The denominator of this bonus take-up rate overstates the number of
claimants who qualified for a bonus, because some claimants who
ended UI within the qualification period were not reemployed in a job
that they held for at least four months.  But again, the available data do
not permit construction of a convincing indicator of full bonus qualifi-
cation.
Column 4 of Table 3.1 displays estimates of the bonus take-up rate
for each experiment.  The figures again suggest that participation in the
Illinois and Washington experiments was greater than in the Pennsylva-
nia experiment.  Take-up rates were 32 percent in Illinois (which had a
qualification period of 11 weeks), 18 and 21 percent for the long-quali-
fication-period treatments in Pennsylvania, and 22, 29, and 33 percent
for the long-qualification-period treatments in Washington.  We explore
possible explanations of these differences in the next section.  
These observations on bonus qualification, receipt, and take-up can
be tied together by observing that there is a simple relationship among
the three.  Specifically, the probability that a worker receives a bonus is
the product of the probability that she partially qualifies for a bonus
and the probability that she collects a bonus given that she partially
qualified:
Pr(bonus received) = Pr(partially qualified for bonus) 
× Pr(bonus received | partially qualified)
In Table 3.1, these probabilities translate into the proportions
(expressed as percentages) shown in columns 3 (bonus receipt), 2 (par-
tial bonus qualification), and 4 (bonus take-up).
The above relationship makes clear that bonus receipt depends
partly on a probability that is to some degree beyond the control of a
worker—the probability of partially qualifying for a bonus, which
depends on the existence of job vacancies as well as on a worker’s job
search efforts.  Bonus receipt also depends on a probability that is to a
significant extent a matter of voluntary program participation—the
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probability of collecting a bonus conditional on ending UI by the qual-
ification date.  In the next section, we examine the correlates of each of
these three probabilities.
EXPLAINING VARIATIONS IN BONUS 
QUALIFICATION, RECEIPT, AND TAKE-UP
To what extent can the differences in partial bonus qualification,
bonus receipt, and bonus take-up rates among the three experiments be
explained by the characteristics of claimants who enrolled in each of
the three experiments and other observable variables?  We approach
this issue by using the data on individual claimants from each of the
three experiments to estimate linear probability models of participation
in the bonus experiments.  Each of the models we estimate has a zero-
one dependent variable indicating some form of participation in the
reemployment bonus experiment—partial qualification for a bonus,
bonus receipt, or bonus receipt conditional on partial qualification (that
is, bonus take-up).
Partial Qualification for the Bonus
We first examine the correlates of partial qualification for the
bonus.  Columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table 3.2 report estimates of a model in
which the dependent variable equals 1 if a claimant stopped receiving
UI benefits by the qualification date, zero otherwise.  In view of the
data limitations described in note 1 to this chapter, this measure of par-
tial qualification is the best available measure of qualification for a
bonus.  For each of the three experiments, we regress partial qualifica-
tion on the following explanatory variables:
• Gender of the claimant.
• Ethnicity of the claimant.
• Age of the claimant.
• Whether the claimant was employed in manufacturing before the
current UI claim spell.
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• Whether the claimant expected to be recalled to the previous job
(in Pennsylvania or Washington only) or received job referrals
only through a union (in Washington only).
• Base period earnings of the claimant (in $10,000s)—that is, earn-
ings in roughly the year preceding the initial claim for UI bene-
fits.
• Basic features of the UI benefits received by the claimant—the
weekly benefit amount (in $100s) and the potential duration of UI
benefits.  In Illinois, the latter is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the worker was eligible for FSC—that is, a total of 38 weeks of
benefits rather than only 26 weeks of regular state benefits.  In
Pennsylvania, potential duration of benefits is modeled by a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker was eligible for 26
weeks of benefits, rather than the 16 weeks of benefits for which
about 1 percent of Pennsylvania claimants were eligible.  In
Washington, potential duration is modeled as the number of
weeks of benefits for which the worker was eligible (times 10,
which scales the variable to make its coefficient roughly compa-
rable to those of the Illinois and Pennsylvania potential duration
variables).
• In Pennsylvania and Washington, characteristics of the bonus
offer made to the claimant, modeled in each case as a set of
dummy variables.  As in Table 3.1, treatments are referred to by
their bonus amount (low or high in Pennsylvania; low, medium,
or high in Washington) and the qualification period (short or
long).
• A set of site dummy variables indicating the ES office where the
claimant was assigned to treatment status and informed of the
bonus offer.  These site variables may capture a variety of effects,
including differences from site-to-site in the way the bonus
experiment was applied as well as regional differences in the
labor market, which would affect the difficulty of obtaining reem-
ployment.  (Coefficients of the site dummies are not reported in
the table.)





























































































































































































































































































































































Low bonus NA NA reference NA NA reference NA NA reference






















































Sample size 4,186 8,748 12,452 4,186 8,748 12,452 1,795 4,947 6,939
R2 0.040 0.054 0.092 0.036 0.045 0.048 0.047 0.078 0.124
MSE 0.235 0.232 0.224 0.113 0.090 0.118 0.206 0.140 0.169
a OLS coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses.
b “NA” indicates that the variable does not apply to the analysis.
c The Pennsylvania and Washington bonus characteristics are not strictly comparable, but the medium and high bonus amounts are similar, as are
the short and long qualification periods.  There was no low bonus amount in Pennsylvania.  Also included in each regrression is a set of site
dummy variables indicating where the claimant was assigned to the bonus experiment.
d “Reference” refers to the reference category in a set of categorical variables.
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We estimate a separate model of bonus receipt for each of the three
experiments because pairwise tests for pooling the samples (Chow
tests) strongly reject pooling.
Although many of the relationships between the explanatory vari-
ables and partial bonus qualification differ across the three experi-
ments, some patterns do emerge (see columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table 3.2).
These patterns reflect widely observed patterns of unemployment dura-
tion by ethnicity, age, and so on.  For example, ethnic minorities tend
to be less likely to partially qualify for a bonus (in Illinois and Wash-
ington), and younger workers are more likely than older workers to
partially qualify for a bonus.  Both outcomes reflect the shorter spells
of unemployment that white workers and younger workers generally
experience.  Higher weekly benefit amounts (in Pennsylvania and
Washington) tend to reduce the probability of partially qualifying for a
bonus, and greater potential duration of benefits (in Illinois and Wash-
ington) tends to increase the probability of partially qualifying.
The estimates suggest that larger bonus offers and longer qualifica-
tion periods lead to higher probabilities of partially qualifying for a
bonus.  The increases in partial qualification resulting from increased
bonus amounts are rather small and are statistically significant only in
the case of the high bonus amount in Washington (compare the coeffi-
cients of the low, medium, and high bonus amounts under the bonus
characteristics in Table 3.2).  It is much clearer that partial qualification
rates rise with the length of the qualification period (compare the coef-
ficients of the short and long qualification periods under the bonus
characteristics in Table 3.2).
In regressions that are not reported, we included the bonus amount
and the qualification period as continuous variables in models that are
otherwise the same as those reported in Table 3.2.  These regressions
suggest that a $1,000 increase in the bonus amount increased the prob-
ability of partially qualifying by about 3 percentage points in Pennsyl-
vania and by about 6 percentage points in Washington.  They also
suggest that extending the bonus qualification period by one week
increased the probability of partially qualifying by about 1.5 percent-
age points in both Pennsylvania and Washington.
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Bonus Receipt
Columns 4, 5, and 6 of Table 3.2 display estimates of models in
which a dummy variable equal to 1 if a claimant received a bonus (zero
otherwise) is regressed on the same explanatory variables used in the
partial qualification equations reported in columns 1–3.  The bonus
receipt equations have less explanatory power than do the partial quali-
fication equations (see the lower adjusted R2 values at the bottom of
Table 3.2).  Again we estimate a separate model for each of the three
experiments because pooling is rejected for the model of bonus receipt,
as it was for partial qualification.
Most of the relationships between bonus receipt and the explana-
tory variables are similar to the those observed for partial qualification.
Ethnic minorities are less likely to receive a bonus (in all three experi-
ments), and younger workers are more likely to receive a bonus than
are older workers (again in all three experiments).  Workers who expect
recall are less likely to receive a bonus (in Pennsylvania and Washing-
ton).  Greater potential duration of benefits (in Illinois and Washington)
tends to increase the probability of bonus receipt.  Although higher
weekly benefit amounts tend to reduce the probability of partially qual-
ifying for a bonus, higher weekly benefit amounts tend to increase the
probability of bonus receipt (in Illinois and Washington).  (We return to
this point in the discussion of bonus take-up rates below.)  Also,
although there is an ambiguous relationship between the industry from
which a worker was laid off and partial qualification, workers laid off
from manufacturing jobs seem less likely than others to receive a bonus
(in Pennsylvania and Washington).
The probability of bonus receipt increases strongly both with larger
bonus offers and with longer qualification periods—compare the coef-
ficients of the low, medium, and high bonus amounts and those of the
short and long qualification periods under the bonus characteristics in
Table 3.2.  In regressions not reported, we find that a $1,000 increase in
the bonus offer increased the probability of bonus receipt by 4.5 per-
centage points in Pennsylvania and by 10 percentage points in Wash-
ington.  Extending the bonus qualification period by one week
increased the probability of bonus receipt by about 1 percentage point
in both Pennsylvania and Washington.
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Bonus Take-Up Rates
The third issue we seek to understand is what factors influenced
whether a claimant who partially qualified for a bonus ultimately col-
lected a bonus.  This propensity of claimants who partially qualified for
a bonus to collect a bonus is the bonus take-up rate. Columns 7, 8, and
9 of Table 3.2 display estimates of take-up rate models for Illinois,
Pennsylvania, and Washington.3  In each, we have regressed a dummy
variable equal to 1 if a claimant received a bonus (zero otherwise) on
the same explanatory variables that were used in the partial qualifica-
tion and bonus receipt equations already discussed.  The difference
between the take-up rate models and the partial qualification and bonus
receipt models is that the sample used in the take-up rate models
includes only treatment-assigned claimants who partially qualified for
the bonus (that is, ended UI benefit receipt by the qualification date).
These estimates show several patterns.  Women tend to have higher
take-up rates than men, other things equal, although the relationship is
strong and statistically significant only in Washington.  Ethnic minori-
ties have much lower take-up rates than whites in all three experiments.
Workers laid off from manufacturing jobs have lower take-up rates
than other workers (in Pennsylvania and Washington).  These effects
arguably reflect differences in tastes—including possible differences in
the extent to which workers trust the experimenters—that exist among
different groups of workers.
Workers who expected to be recalled or (in Washington) to be
placed by a union had much lower take-up rates than others, all else
equal.  In Pennsylvania, this effect was in addition to a lower tendency
of workers who expected recall to qualify for a bonus.  In Washington,
this effect offsets the (rather surprising) positive effect of recall expec-
tations on partial qualification and produces a net negative impact of
recall expectations on the probability of bonus receipt.
Higher weekly benefit amounts (in all three experiments) are asso-
ciated with higher take-up rates.  This result seems counterintuitive, at
least in Illinois, where a given bonus provides a smaller payoff (in rela-
tive terms) to a worker who receives high weekly benefits than to a
worker who receives low weekly benefits.  A possible interpretation,
however, is that workers with higher weekly benefits tend to have rela-
tively higher human capital and earnings.  In other words, workers with
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high weekly benefit amounts are likely to be more productive, better
able to make use of the UI system, and more likely to collect a bonus
for which they qualify.4
A potentially interesting result is the relatively weak relationship
between the potential duration of benefits and the bonus take-up rate.
Recall that (except in Pennsylvania) longer potential duration of bene-
fits lead to higher probabilities of qualifying for and receiving a bonus.
The relationship between potential duration and bonus take-up is
weaker in both Illinois and Washington, however, which suggests that
the gross relationship between potential duration and bonus receipt
results from search behavior, not bonus take-up behavior.  That is, the
evidence is consistent with the idea that bonus offers lead to a signifi-
cant increase in the search intensity of workers for whom the potential
duration of benefits is longer.  Their propensity to collect a bonus is no
greater than that of workers whose potential duration of benefits is
shorter, but because they increase their search intensity more than do
workers with shorter potential duration of benefits, a higher proportion
of workers with a long potential duration of benefits qualifies for and
ultimately collects a bonus.
The results in Table 3.2 suggest that larger bonus offers lead unam-
biguously to larger bonus take-up rates.  In regressions not reported,
we find that a $1,000 increase in the bonus offer would have increased
the take-up rate by 8 percentage points in Pennsylvania and by 17 per-
centage points in Washington.  
We have seen that larger bonus offers result in a higher probability
of receiving a bonus, but they are only weakly related to the probability
of qualifying for a bonus.  The results in columns 7, 8, and 9 of Table
3.2 show that the observed positive effect of a larger bonus offer on
bonus receipt occurs because larger bonus offers increase the take-up
rate.  That is, larger bonuses raise the probability of bonus receipt
mainly because they raise the bonus take-up rate, not because they
raise the probability of qualification.  The point is potentially important
in designing a reemployment bonus program.  If higher bonus offers
raise the bonus take-up rate without significantly raising the probability
of partial qualification for a bonus (that is, of cutting short the spell of
unemployment), then a higher bonus would lead to larger bonus pay-
ments without the benefit of shortening unemployment spells.  This
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question is considered further in Chapter 4 when we consider the opti-
mal size of a bonus offer.
Extending the bonus qualification period has a relatively weak
effect on the probability of bonus take-up.  Although statistically non-
zero, the coefficients on the long qualification period variable are rather
small in the take-up equations compared with those in the qualification
equations.  In unreported regressions, we find that extending the bonus
qualification period by one week would have increased the take-up rate
by less than 1 percentage point in Pennsylvania and Washington.  A
longer qualification period makes it easier to qualify for a bonus but
does not increase a worker’s incentive to collect a bonus (as does an
increase in the bonus amount).  Accordingly, it makes sense that the
take-up rate should be weakly affected by the length of the qualifica-
tion period.
EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES AMONG THE EXPERIMENTS
How would partial qualification for the bonus, bonus receipt, and
bonus take-up have differed if the workers in one experiment (Illinois,
say) had faced the “structure” of partial qualification, bonus receipt,
and bonus take-up that existed in either of the other experiments (Penn-
sylvania or Washington)?  Answering this question can suggest the
extent to which differences among the experiments in partial qualifica-
tion, bonus receipt, and bonus take-up can be explained by differences
in observable factors associated with the experiments, such as the char-
acteristics of claimants and characteristics of the labor market where
the experiments were conducted.
For example, we could ask how many of the workers assigned to
the Illinois treatment would have received a bonus if their probability
of receiving a bonus had been determined by the structure of bonus
receipt estimated in the Pennsylvania experiment.  First, let xPA denote
the vector of mean observed characteristics of the workers who were
assigned to a treatment in Pennsylvania and let bPA denote the vector of
estimated coefficients from the Pennsylvania bonus receipt equation.
Then the proportion of Pennsylvania claimants who actually received a
bonus (yPA) can be expressed as:
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yPA = xPA · bPA
Next, we can simulate the proportion of Illinois claimants who
would have received a bonus if their bonus receipt were determined by
the structure of bonus receipt observed in the Pennsylvania experiment.
We denote this simulated proportion by yIL|PA and compute it by substi-
tuting the mean characteristics of the Illinois claimants (xIL) into the
Pennsylvania bonus receipt equation:
yIL|PA = xIL · bPA
The dot product xIL · bPA is a simulated proportion of Illinois bonus
recipients because it applies the model of bonus receipt that was esti-
mated for the Pennsylvania experiment to the characteristics of work-
ers assigned to the Illinois experiment.  A similar approach can be used
to simulate the proportion of Washington claimants who would have
received a bonus if they had been assigned to the Pennsylvania experi-
ment, and so on.
Implementing the above procedure requires that the partial qualifi-
cation, receipt, and take-up equations reported in Table 3.2 be modified
in three ways.  First, in the Illinois and Pennsylvania models, the
dummy variables indicating the potential duration of UI benefits are
replaced with continuous variables for the potential duration of UI ben-
efits.  Second, in the Pennsylvania and Washington models, the bonus
amount and qualification period dummy variables are replaced with
continuous variables indicating bonus amount and length of the qualifi-
cation period (there was no variation in either the bonus amount or
qualification period in Illinois).  Third, in the models for all three
experiments, we replace the site dummies with two sets of variables
that attempt to capture the state of the labor market in which workers
sought reemployment:
• The unemployment rate in the local area and quarter in which the
worker filed his or her initial claim for UI benefits (entered as
four dummy variables: less than 5 percent, from 5 to 7 percent,
from 7 to 10 percent, and greater than 10 percent).
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• The percentage change in employment in the local area where the
worker filed the initial claim during the three months following
the initial claim.5
The above modifications are needed so that the mean characteristics of
the workers in each experiment can be substituted into the structure of
partial qualification, bonus receipt, and bonus take-up estimated for the
other experiments.  The dummy variables that were used to character-
ize the potential duration of UI benefits, bonus characteristics, and sites
in the models reported in Table 3.2 are not conformable across the
three experiments.
Table 3.3 displays the results of simulating the partial qualification,
bonus receipt, and take-up rates for each of the three experiments using
the approach outlined above.  The actual bonus receipt rate in Illinois
was 13.6 percent, in Pennsylvania 10.6 percent, and in Washington
14.6 percent (column 2).  The differences among the three experiments
can be explained in either of two ways.  First, recall that the probability
of bonus receipt is the product of the probability of partially qualifying
for a bonus and the probability of taking up a bonus for which one par-
tially qualifies (see pp. 83).  Column 1 of Table 3.3 shows that the par-
tial qualification rates were higher in Pennsylvania and Washington
than in Illinois.  However, Illinois made up for its low partial qualifica-
tion rate by having the highest take-up rate, and Pennsylvania was
pulled down by the lowest take-up rate.  This much we already knew
from Table 3.1.
The simulations in Table 3.3 allow a second, potentially more
revealing, kind of explanation of the differences among the three
experiments.  The simulations let us speculate about whether the differ-
ences among the three experiments in partial qualification and take-up
rates can in turn be explained by differences among the three in the
characteristics of the experimental claimants or the labor market condi-
tions they faced.  If claimant characteristics and labor market condi-
tions don’t explain much of the differences, then we would have to
conclude that the differences in partial qualification and take-up stem
from factors that are not captured in the variables that we can quantify
and observe.
The partial qualification rates in column 1 suggest that more of the
Illinois claimants would have partially qualified for a bonus if they had
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been in either the Pennsylvania or the Washington experiment (57.2 or
65 percent, instead of the actual 42.9 percent).  Fewer Pennsylvania
claimants would have partially qualified for a bonus in Illinois (46.1
percent, instead of the actual 56.6 percent), and a somewhat higher per-
centage of Pennsylvania claimants would have partially qualified for a
bonus in Washington (58.3 percent, instead of the actual 56.6 percent).
Finally, fewer of the Washington claimants would have partially quali-
fied for a bonus in either Illinois (47.3 percent, instead of the actual 55.7
percent) or in Pennsylvania (49.1 percent, instead of the actual 55.7 per-
cent).
However, differences among the experiments in the observable
characteristics of the claimants and the labor market explain little if
Table 3.3 Actual and Simulated Partial Qualification, Bonus Receipt, and 








Illinois means applied to
Illinois model (actual) 42.9 13.6 31.8
Pennsylvania model 57.2 10.1 19.8
Washington model 65.0 20.8 32.8
Pennsylvania means applied to
Illinois model 46.1 19.7 42.5
Pennsylvania model (actual) 56.6 10.6 18.6
Washington model 58.3 19.1 25.3
Washington means applied to
Illinois model 47.3 19.4 41.7
Pennsylvania model 49.1 10.3 17.3
Washington model (actual) 55.7 14.6 26.1
a The simulated take-up rates were obtained by substituting the mean characteristics of,
for example, the Illinois treatment group into the take-up equations that were esti-
mated for the Pennsylvania and Washington treatment groups.  Actual values are
shaded.  See the text for further discussion.
b Partial qualification is defined as ending UI receipt by the bonus qualification date.  
c The take-up rate is defined as the percentage of workers who actually collected a
bonus given that they stopped receiving UI benefits by the qualification date.
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any of the differences between Illinois and the other two experiments
in partial qualification rates.  For example, the actual difference
between the Illinois and Pennsylvania partial qualification rates is 13.7
percentage points (56.6 minus 42.9).  If the Illinois claimants had been
assigned to the Pennsylvania experiment, the simulations suggest that
their partial qualification rates would have increased to 57.2 percent—
similar to what was actually observed in Pennsylvania.  Hence, none of
the difference between the Illinois and Pennsylvania partial qualifica-
tion rates is explained by differences between the two experiments in
observed variables.  Rather, the differences depend wholly on how
observed variables map into the probability of partially qualifying in
each of the two experiments.  
The conclusion is slightly less negative if we ask what would have
happened to the Pennsylvania claimants if they had been assigned to
the Illinois experiment.  If the Pennsylvania claimants had been
assigned in Illinois, their partial qualification rate would have fallen to
46.1 percent—3.2 percentage points higher than was observed in Illi-
nois.  Hence, observed variables explain less than one-quarter of the
total observed difference between partial qualification rates in Illinois
and Pennsylvania (3.2 points out of the total 13.7-point difference)—
the rest is unexplained.  (A decomposition of this simulation, which we
do not report, shows that this 3.2 percentage point difference can be
explained roughly half and half by more favorable labor market condi-
tions in Pennsylvania and by Pennsylvania claimants having character-
istics that are more favorable to partially qualifying for a bonus.)
Comparison of the Illinois and Washington partial qualification
rates gives similar results.  The actual difference between the Illinois
and Washington partial qualification rates is 12.8 percentage points
(55.7 minus 42.9).  If the Illinois claimants had been assigned to the
Washington experiment, their partial qualification rates would have
been 65 percent, which suggests that observables explain none of the
differences in partial qualification between Illinois and Washington.  On
the other hand, if the Washington claimants had been assigned to the
Illinois experiment, their qualification rates would have been 47.3 per-
cent, which suggests that observables can explain only about one-third
of the total difference between the partial qualification rates in Illinois
and Washington (4.4 points out of the total 12.8-point difference).  
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Given that the Illinois experiment occurred during the early stages
of a recovery (late 1984 and early 1985), whereas the Pennsylvania and
Washington experiments occurred after the recovery had matured
(1988–1989), it is tempting to suggest that relatively slack labor demand
played an important role in lowering the Illinois qualification rates.
However, given that we have tried to control for labor market conditions
in the partial qualification models, this is purely a speculative and post
hoc rationalization of the apparent difference between Illinois and the
other two experiments in how partial qualification came about.  (There
may be deficiencies in the labor market controls we have included, but
they are standard measures of the health of the labor market.)
Consider next the take-up rates shown in column 3 of Table 3.3:
the observed take-up rate was 31.8 percent in Illinois, 18.6 percent in
Pennsylvania, and 26.1 percent in Washington.  Was the take-up rate
lowest in Pennsylvania and highest in Illinois as a result of differences
in observable characteristics of claimants and the labor market condi-
tions they faced, or do the differences stem from factors that are not
captured in the observed variables?
The take-up rate was lower in Pennsylvania than in Illinois and
Washington for reasons that are not accounted for by observed vari-
ables.  Far fewer Illinois claimants would have taken up a bonus if they
had been in the Pennsylvania experiment (just 19.8 percent, instead of
the actual 31.8 percent).  Similarly, fewer of the Washington claimants
would have taken up a bonus if they had been in the Pennsylvania
experiment (17.3 percent, instead of the actual 26.1 percent).  That is,
given individual and labor market characteristics mapped into much
lower take-up rates in Pennsylvania than in either Illinois or Washing-
ton, and differences among the three experiments in measurable char-
acteristics of claimants or labor market conditions do not explain the
differences in take-up behavior.  As with the partial qualification rates,
differences in the take-up rates depend on the “structure” of bonus
take-up—that is, on how observables map into the probability of bonus
take-up in each of the experiments—rather than on individual charac-
teristics or measurable features of the labor market.
Another way to see the point is to note that the Pennsylvania claim-
ants would have had a much higher take-up rate either in Illinois (42.5
percent) or in Washington (25.3 percent) than they actually did (18.6
percent).  The simulated take-up rate for Illinois (42.5 percent) is well
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above the actual take-up rate in Illinois (31.8 percent), and the simu-
lated rate for Washington (25.3 percent) is very close to the actual
take-up rate in Washington (26.3 percent), indicating again that the dif-
ferences among the three experiments in take-up behavior cannot be
explained by measurable characteristics of claimants or labor market
conditions.  It is clear that something about the Pennsylvania experi-
ment—other than claimants’ characteristics and the state of the labor
market, at least to the extent that we have been able to control for these
variables—resulted in lower take-up rates in Pennsylvania than in
either Illinois or Washington.
Our inability to explain the large difference between the bonus
take-up rates in Pennsylvania on the one hand, and Illinois and Wash-
ington on the other, suggests again the difficulty in predicting and
understanding participation in a bonus program.  It is difficult to quan-
tify, or even to characterize descriptively, differences in a program’s
implementation from state to state and site to site.  Yet differences in
implementation of the three experiments would seem to be the most
likely source of the large gap between the take-up rates of Pennsylva-
nia and the other two experiments.
Anecdotal evidence on the Illinois experiment illustrates the poten-
tial importance to program participation of variables that are intangible
and hard to quantify.  In the Illinois experiment, each claimant who
was assigned to a treatment was asked to sign a form indicating will-
ingness to participate in the experiment.  At one of the experimental
sites, the treatment was administered by a woman who was reported to
be enthusiastic about the reemployment bonus and readily trusted by
the experimental claimants.  (She was described to one of us as “grand-
motherly.”)  At this site, the rates of willingness to participate and
bonus take-up were higher than the average for the experiment as a
whole, even after adjusting for measurable correlates of willingness to
participate and bonus take-up.  This sort of evidence is a reminder that
a bonus treatment—like any treatment—includes more than a financial
incentive.  It also includes the way the incentive is presented and the
attitude and trustworthiness of those who are assigned the job of
administering the treatment.
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DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
This chapter has attempted to sort out differences among the Illi-
nois, Pennsylvania, and Washington reemployment bonus experiments
in what we have referred to generally as “participation.”  By participa-
tion in the bonus experiments, we mean three things: qualifying (in this
case, partially) for a bonus, actually receiving a bonus, and collecting a
bonus given partial qualification for a bonus (bonus take-up).  These
three concepts of participation are related by a simple identity: the
probability of a worker receiving a bonus is the product of the proba-
bility that she partially qualifies and the probability that she collects a
bonus given that she partially qualified.  Table 3.1 shows each of these
as empirical probabilities (expressed as percentages) of claimants qual-
ifying for a bonus (column 2), receiving a bonus (column 3), and tak-
ing up a bonus (column 4).
Table 3.1 and the discussion on pp. 78–84 showed that the partial
qualification rate in Illinois (43 percent) was much lower than in either
Pennsylvania (57 percent) or Washington (56 percent).  Ultimately,
however, nearly as high a percentage of claimants received a bonus in
Illinois (13.6 percent) as in Washington (14.6 percent), whereas only
10.6 percent of the Pennsylvania claimants received a bonus.  The sim-
ple explanation is that the bonus take-up rate was higher in Illinois
(31.8 percent) than in either Pennsylvania (where it was just 18.6 per-
cent) or Washington (where it was 26.1 percent).  At a rather superficial
level, then, we were able to explain the bonus receipt rate.
But we are much less successful in quantifying the large differ-
ences across the experiments in the partial qualification and take-up
rates that underlie the bonus receipt rate.  The qualification models
suggest, not surprisingly, that the correlates of partial qualification are
similar to the correlates of short spells of unemployment (see Table
3.2).  For example, younger workers and white workers are more likely
than older workers and ethnic minorities to qualify for a bonus.  Also,
not surprisingly, higher bonus amounts and longer qualification periods
tend to increase the probability of qualifying for a bonus.  The bonus
receipt models offer similar findings.
The bonus take-up estimates differ in some ways from the partial
qualification and receipt estimates.  The probability of collecting a
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bonus conditional on qualifying is influenced again by ethnicity (with
racial minorities less likely to take up a bonus) and the bonus amount
(with larger bonuses more likely to be collected), but several additional
relationships also emerge.  Women, nonmanufacturing workers, and
workers who do not expect to be recalled are more likely to take up a
bonus.  Workers with higher weekly benefit amounts are more likely to
take up a bonus.  Those who face a longer qualification period are only
slightly more likely than others to take up a bonus.
Nevertheless, it would be an understatement to say that puzzles
remain in explaining differences in partial qualification, receipt, and
take-up among the three experiments.  In the last section, we use esti-
mated models of partial qualification, receipt, and take-up to simulate
the percentages of claimants who would have partially qualified for,
received, and taken up a bonus if they had been assigned to one of the
other experiments (see Table 3.3).  Such simulations can suggest the
extent to which differences among the experiments in observed partici-
pation are accounted for by observable differences in the characteris-
tics of claimants (or in the labor market conditions they faced).  We
find that measurable differences in claimants’ characteristics or labor
market conditions explain very little of the differences across the three
experiments in partial qualification and bonus take-up behavior.
Instead, the differences depend on the “structure” of partial qualifica-
tion and bonus take-up—that is, on how claimants’ characteristics map
into the probability of partial qualification or bonus take-up in each of
the experiments 
We are left with rather ad hoc explanations of the differences in
participation across the three experiments.  Perhaps partial qualifica-
tion for the bonus was lower in Illinois than in Pennsylvania or Wash-
ington because the Illinois experiment took place during the early part
of the 1980s recovery (whereas the Pennsylvania and Washington
experiments occurred after the recovery had matured) or because of
some other difficult-to-quantify feature of the labor market in Illinois.
Perhaps the bonus offer was presented to claimants differently (and
less attractively) in Pennsylvania than in Illinois or Washington.  In
fact, there is no convincing quantitative evidence for or against either
of these views.  The conclusion is that the estimated models of partial
qualification and take-up offer little help in explaining the differences
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among the three experiments in the observed partial qualification and
take-up rates.
Notes
1. The figures for the control group in Pennsylvania (“Control/short qual. period”
and “Control/long qual. period”) were obtained by observing the number of
claimants in the Pennsylvania control group who stopped receiving UI benefits
within 6 weeks and 12 weeks, respectively.  A similar approach yielded the figures
for the Washington control group. 
2. Two types of administrative data were used in the analysis: UI claims records,
which provide data on the timing and amounts of UI benefits paid to claimants;
and wage records, which provide data on each worker’s quarterly earnings in UI-
covered employment in the state where the worker claimed UI benefits.  Because
the wage records are quarterly, they do not provide information on the exact tim-
ing of reemployment or whether employment was continuous during the required
four months.  Also, because wage records provide information only on UI-cov-
ered employment in the state where each worker claimed benefits, they miss
reemployment in jobs that are in another state or are not covered by UI.
Note that the partial qualification measure used in this chapter differs from the
full qualification concept that is used elsewhere in this volume (especially Chapter
6).  As a result, the bonus take-up rates that are calculated in this chapter cannot
be compared with those derived in Chapter 6.  In Chapter 6, the take-up rate is
defined as the proportion of UI claimants who received a bonus given that they 1)
were eligible for UI benefits, 2) became reemployed and stopped receiving UI
benefits by the qualification date, and 3) remained employed for four months.  In
other words, the bonus take-up rate is the proportion of claimants who fully qual-
ified for the bonus who then collected a bonus.  Conceptually, this latter definition
is the correct definition of the bonus take-up rate.
3. Pooling of the three experiments was rejected for the bonus take-up rate models as
it was for the models of partial qualification and bonus receipt.
4. A possible problem with this interpretation is that the regressions already control
for base period earnings.  But base period earnings and the weekly benefit amount
are systematically related and may be collinear.  Indeed, the coefficients on base
period earnings are essentially zero in Illinois and Washington (in Pennsylvania
the coefficient is positive), so it is tempting to suggest that the weekly benefit
amount variable is capturing most of the effect of higher earnings capacity on
bonus take-up.
5. The employment level used is a three-month moving average of employment in
the local area where the worker filed for UI benefits.
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